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In this paper, we analyse the transmission channels of monetary policy.
We do this by simulation in an agent-based, stock-flow consistent model. A
unique feature of the model compared to other work is its inter-bank market,
which allows for a realistic treatment of monetary policy implementation.
We trace the effects through banks, firms and households of interest rate
shocks of different sizes and at different stages of the business cycle. Three
findings stand out. Of all transmission channels, the bank lending channel
appears the strongest. Second, the effects are highly non-linear. Third, since
the model economy exhibits path-dependency, timing matters: changes to
the monetary policy rate in a boom have markedly different impacts from
interest rate shocks in a down-swing of the business cycle.
Keywords: Agent-based modelling, Monetary transmission, Inflation.
1 Introduction
We analyze the transmission channels of monetary policy by simulation in an
agent-based, stock-flow consistent (AB-SFC) model. The monetary trans-
mission mechanism describes how central bank interest rate influences in-
flation, output and employment. The mechanism is extensively investigated
in central bank publications [1, 2, 3] and macroeconomic textbooks [4, 5].
There is also an extensive literature on the different channels through which
this mechanism might operate; for an early overview, see Mishkin [6]. For
discussions and analysis, see e.g. Chowdhury et al. and Disyatat [7, 8] on
the cost and bank lending channels, respectively. A common challenge is to
open the ‘black box‘ of conditions in which policy transmission does or does
not occur [9]. As Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen [10] recently
said, in order to analyse these channels we need a detailed understanding
of how ’spending by households and firms responds to changes in labour
income, business sales, or the value of collateral‘. The present model is de-
signed to trace these responses, which in turn determine policy impacts on
inflation, output and employment.
From the literature, we identify six channels through which monetary
policy can influence inflation in a closed economy: the consumption channel,
the investment channel, the asset-price channel, the bank lending channel,
the balance-sheet channel, and the cost channel. The combined effect of
these channels on inflation is not clear a priori. They might run in oppo-
site directions. In addition, there may be interaction effects and feedback
between different channels. For example, increased consumption through
the consumption channel might amplify the balance sheet channel as it also
causes an increase in firm’s net-worth.
These myriad and interacting effects make it difficult to precisely trace
and model the effects of monetary policy on inflation in a model that is solved
for an equilibrium, as in the commonly applied general-equilibrium frame-
work. This framework suffers from aggregation problems and challenges in
incorporating complex dynamics. Although in this New-Keynesian DSGE
modelling tradition, there are now several somewhat disaggregated models
[11, 12, 13], these models still aggregate whole sectors. This means crucial
information might remain unexplored. [14] Gabaix shows that idiosyncratic
firm-level shocks can explain an important part of aggregate movements due
to, for instance, inter-sectoral input-output linkages [15].
Examples of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium DSGE models, which
analyse transmission, include the following. In Preston and Eusepi [16], cur-
rent and expected future interest rates regulate spending and savings plans
which in turn influence aggregate demand and inflation (i.e. the consump-
tion and investment channels). Fiore and Tristani [17] model households,
wholesale firms, retail firms, entrepreneurs, and a central bank. They find
that in the presence of some exogenous disturbances (labelled ’technology
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shock’) and financial market imperfections (sticky prices), there is a trade-
off between output and inflation stabilization. The model of Ravenna and
Walsh[18] includes households, firms, financial intermediaries, a government
and central bank. They model the cost channel, in which firms’ marginal
costs depend directly on the nominal rate of interest. Cost-push inflation
arises in response to an interest rate shock. For more detailed discussions
of progress and challenges in DSGE and other general-equilibrium models,
we refer to Blanchard et al., Blanchard, and Kaplan et al. [4, 19, 12].
Our approach represents a departure from the general-equilibrium frame-
work. Bonabeau [20] calls for an agent-based modelling approach to study
social systems in general and Farmer and Foley and Tesfatsion [21, 22] for
the economy in particullar. We set up an agent-based model to analyze
the macroecoomic dynamics of monetary policy transmission. Fagiolo and
Roventini[23] demonstrate the advantages of agent-based models for policy
analysis. In particular, agent-based models help the analyst to deal with
the fact that agents are heterogeneous, and that the economy’s structure is
subject to continuous change [24].
We do not specify which policy transmission channels will or will not
operate. Instead, we specify an economy in which, in principle, all channels
can be operational. In our model, agents interact directly, in a decentral-
ized way, rather than via a market clearing mechanism, which revises prices
to equalize demand and supply. Furthermore, the focus is on agents’ com-
plete balance sheet, rather than on a subset of assets or liabilities traded on
specific markets. The AB-SFC model structure allows for decision-making
under uncertainty (as opposed to perfect rationality and full information),
agents interactions within economic structures (as opposed to single-agent
analysis), path-dependency [25], and explicit modelling of the financial na-
ture of the economy [26].
The paper is part of a developing strand of research on macroeconomic
agent-based models. Other examples of such models include work by the
’Eurace’ modelling group [27, 28], the ’Complexity Research Initiative for
Systemic Instabilities’ (CRISIS) model [29], the ’Schumpeter + Keynes’
model (Dosi and others, 2015), and the work developed around the ’JAMEL’
model [30, 31]. Agent-based models are also starting to be applied in central
banks [32]. In this paper we present and AB-SFC macroeconomic model,
which builds on the model presented by Caiani et al. [33].
A unique feature of the model is its detailed interbank market, which
allows for a realistic treatment of monetary policy implementation. We trace
the effects of interest rate shocks of different sizes and at different stages
of the business cycle on banks, firms and households. In our simulations,
three findings stand out. Of all transmission channels, the bank lending
channel appears the strongest. Second, the effects of a shock are highly
non-linear. And third, since the model economy exhibits path-dependency,
timing matters: changes to monetary policy rates in a boom have markedly
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different impacts from interest rate shocks in a quasi steady state. We also
demonstrate how the model structure allows us to link transmission channels
and their outcomes to the model‘s behavioural rules and its structure. This
opens up possibilities to analyse the determinants of transmission channels
in more detail.
In the next section, we describe the model. In section 3, we analyse
model simulations. Section 4 concludes with a summary and discussion of
limitations and future work.
2 The Model
We model a closed economy (i.e. without foreign sector). All model dy-
namics are endogenous. The model was implemented using the Java Macro
Agent-Based (JMAB) 1 modelling software and is based on the AB-SFC
benchmark model presented by Caiani et al. [33].
2.1 Agents
There are six types of agents x: households hh, firms f (divided into con-
sumption goods firms cf and capital goods firms kf), banks b, a central
bank cb, and a government g. All agents have state variables which are rep-
resented by a matrix Vx. Table 3 (in the Appendix) provides an overview
of the state variables Vx,t and their domains. In the notation of variables,
subscripts indicate the agent and time step of the variable. Superscripts
indicate if the variable or parameter refers to another variable, or is an
expectation (e), demanded (d), supplied (s), or targeted (tr) variable.
2.2 Markets
All markets use a common matching protocol. This lets a demand agent
observe a random subset of suppliers, the size of which is determined by
parameter χ representing information asymmetry in that market. Demand
agents pick the supplier who offers the best price; but if the demand agent
has a previous supplier it sticks to this supplier with a probability of changing





pχ if pχ > pk
0 otherwise
, (1)
where  represents the intensity of choice, pχ the lowest observed supplier
price, and pk the price of the selected supplier. In case the preferred supplier
has run out of inventory, the agent picks the supplier with the next best price.
1the source code for jmab can be found at: https://github.com/S120/jmab, the source
code for this model at: https://github.com/S120/Interbank
3
If either the agent has no more demand or there are no more suppliers, then
the algorithm stops. Depending on the market, the demand agent can then
select a new random supplier subset. In that case, the algorithm will run
again. Figure 1 below depicts the market matching protocol.
Figure 1: Market matching protocol.
2.3 Simulation overview
We simulate agent actions and interactions over n periods. As a consequence
of these actions and interactions, the state variables of the agents are imme-
diately updated. Unless stated otherwise, agents are processed in a random
order. Each period represents a month in which we simulate the following
sequence of events:
1. Expectations;
2. Firms’ price determination;






8. Firm labour demand;
9. Credit market interactions;
10. Labour supply;
11. Government labour demand;
12. Central bank policy;
13. Labour market interactions;
14. Firms production;
15. Consumption demand;
16. Capital goods market - second interaction;
17. Consumption goods market interaction;
18. Payments on obligations;
19. Deposit market interactions;
20. Defaults;
21. Bond market - first interaction;
22. Interbank market interactions;
23. Central bank bond demand;
24. Bond market - second interaction;
25. Central bank lending facilities.
2.4 Simulation scheduling
In this section, we describe in detail the simulation algorithm for every
period. Agents are boundedly rational [34]. They can observe their own
state variables, the values of their state variables in the previous period,
and some state variables of other agents. In their decision making, they
follow simple heuristics based on limited information.
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2.4.1 Expectation formation
At the start of every period, each agent computes expected values for state
variables in Vx based on the simple adaptive rule:
V ex,t = V
e
x,t−1 + γ(Vx,t−1 − V ex,t−1), (2)
where γ is an adaptive parameter. Firms compute an output target, otf,tr,
by subtracting current inventories from the inventories needed to satisfy
expected sales, yef,t, and a percentage inventory buffer, ν,
otf,tr = y
e
t (1 + ν)−XGt with X = {K,C}. (3)
In the next step, banks remove any loans from bankrupt debtors from
their balance sheets.
Lb,t = Lb,t − nLb . (4)
If the debtor is a consumption firm, the bank recovers collateral C by
forcing its sale, from which it recovers the proceeds, C = KGιx. Since
capital firms do not have collateral, the loss from their bad loans is fully
borne by banks, who try to diminish this through sale of the firm‘s physical
capital to households.
2.4.2 Firms’ price determination
To determine output prices pf,t, firms apply a mark-up Ψ
XG
f,t over their ex-
pected unit labour costs (ucef,t) times the foreseen amount of labour l
tr
f,t, plus





) ucef,tltrf,t + iLf,t−1Lf,t
otxt
. (5)
Firms revise their mark-up adaptively depending on their inventory. If
current inventory XGx,t−1 is above (below) target XGtrf,t, the mark-up is








Ψulcx,t−1 (1− FN) if XGxt−1XGdx,t > ν
N
, (6)
where FN is a random number drawn from a folded normal distribution




2.4.3 Capital market - first interaction
Consumption firms try to find the cheapest capital supplier. They observe
a subset of suppliers and then select the cheapest, following the market
procedure presented in figure 1.
2.4.4 Investment demand
Consumption firms now determine investment demand. They target a de-
sired production capacity rate of growth κtrc,t based on their desired rate of








Firms then derive demand for capital goods KGdc,t based on their desired
growth of output, taking into account capital replacement. This results in
their nominal investment demand KGdc,t as the product of per–unit capital
good demand and supplier price pk,t.
KGdc,t = pk,t. (8)
2.4.5 Credit supply
In the next step, banks update their internal interest rate on loans, iLb,t






3 plus (minus) a stochastic
amount FN depending on whether they meet their capital ratio target,
iLb,t =
{
fcb,t (1 + FN) if CRb,t < CR
tr
b,t
fcb,t(1− FN) otherwise , (9)
where the capital ratio is calculated by dividing the equity value of assets,
CR = ER+B+L . Bank credit supply is limited only by demand, regulation
and banks‘ own rationing policy [35] as explained below.
2.4.6 Deposit rates
Banks then try to attract deposits by setting deposit interest rates iDb,t based
















1 if ∆icb,t ≥ 0
−1 otherwise .
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If the combined values are sufficiently small, a bank will attempt to buy
reserves by increasing its interest rate by the stochastic term FN . Other-
wise, it will decrease the rate.
iDb,t =
{
iDb,t−1 (1 + FN) if χ
LR + χr + χfu ≥ 0
iDb,t−1 (1− FN) otherwise
. (10)
2.4.7 Credit demand
Then, firms calculate their need for credit, ∆Ldf,t. They calculate their ex-
pected expenditures as nominal desired investment, Itrf,t, plus the dividends
they expect to distribute, dvef,t, plus the share of expected wage levels, σ
times labour use, lf,tlcf,t. Then, adhering to the pecking order theory, they
try to fund investment using their operating cash flows first. The remainder





f,t + σlf,tlcf,t −OCF ef,t, (11)
where OCF are operating cash flows after taxes. Computed as after-tax
profits plus capital amortization costs, minus changes in inventories and
debt repayments.
2.4.8 Labour demand
Firms hire workers. Capital goods firms calculate the output levels they can
achieve based on their capital stock, and then set labour hiring needs δldck,t.





where µl is the productivity of labour.
Consumption firms review their desired capacity utilization, ucf,t and







where δk is the constant capital labour ratio and ucf,t is the rate of ca-









Firms then enter the credit market and request the cheapest loan. The bank
responds by calculating expected profit re as the net present value of future







−∆L− (LGD ∗ θdf ∗ L), (14)




n)Lf is the debt





. is the probability of default, where βf
is a parameter of risk-aversion. If expected profit is positive, banks grant
the loan in full. Otherwise, the loan is denied.
2.4.10 Labour supply
Households which are unemployed for longer than their threshold, umhh,t >
φu update their desired wage wdhh,t by subtracting stochastic amount FN
from the last period‘s level. Employed households increase their asked wage





n=1 uhh,t−n > φu
whh,t−1(1 + FN) otherwise
. (15)
Additionally, every period a share of workers ζt, leave their current em-
ployer and look for a new job.
2.4.11 Government labour demand
The government is committed to hiring a constant share of all households,
σlg,t. Government labour demand is therefore equal to the labour turnover
share ζt,
ldg,t = lg,t−1ζt. (16)
2.4.12 Central bank policy
The supply of central bank advances is not limited or rationed. The central
bank has a fixed lending facility rate iRcb,t . In periods tmon in which monetary
policy changes occur, the lending facility rate changes by an amount Ψmon.
iRcb,t =
{
iRcb,t−1 + Ψmon if t = tmon
iRcb,t−1 otherwise
. (17)
Much like the Bank of England [36], it sets the rate on advances iAcb,t as
a mark-up, ΨA over the official bank rate,
iAcb,t = i
R
cb,t + ΨA. (18)
The central bank also sets a countercyclical capital buffer based on the








CRtrt−1 −Ψpru if LtYt < φpru
CRtrt−1 otherwise
, (19)
where Y is nominal GDP. The central bank also aims to minimize sys-
temic liquidity risk, defined as a situation in which banks’ normal funding
and refinancing channels fail [37], prompting the central bank to act as
lender of last resort.
LRTt =









Now potential employers and employees enter the labour market. Employers
select the employee with the lowest desired wage, according to the market
selection algorithm.
2.4.14 Production
Consumption firms produce consumption goods, using their most productive
capital goods first:
∆CGcf,t = µllcf,tKGcf,tµk. (21)
Capital firms produce according to:
∆KGkf,t = µllkf,t. (22)
2.4.15 Consumption demand
Households set desired consumption cdhh,t as a fixed share α
y of their net
income plus a share αq of their net wealth, Dhh,t + CGhh,t. Desired con-
sumption responds to interest rate changes αq = αq + it−it−1it−1 . Both income









In the consumption market, consumers are matched to the cheapest con-
sumption firm according to the common matching protocol.
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2.4.17 Capital market - round 2
With the supplier fixed and credit obtained, consumption firms enter the
capital market again to purchase their desired capital goods.
2.4.18 Payment on obligations
Then, interactions take place as a consequence of equity, credit, deposit and
other contractual claims (Figure 2).
There are several types of credit claims in the model. Banks have loan
claims on firms, interbank claims on other banks, and they may own govern-
ment bonds. The central bank may own government bonds and in addition
might have lent reserves to deficit banks in the form of advances. Every
period, these credit claims cause repayment and interest payments from
debtors to creditors.
There are two types of transferable debt claims in the model. Banks and
the government hold reserves at the central bank. Households and firms
hold deposit accounts at the banks. This leads to payments of interest on
transferable debt claims and transfers of claims in settlement of payment
transactions. Reserves and deposits are used to settle payments by the
government and by banks; deposits are used to settle household and firm
payments.
Finally, some debt claims are off-balance sheet but are implied by con-
tracts. These are tax, social benefits, and wage claims. Households, banks
and firms are all obliged to pay income taxes to the government; all em-
ployers (the government, firms and banks) are obliged to pay wages to their
household employees. The government has an obligation to pay social secu-
rity to unemployed households.
We now describe the payments due over every obligation, j, in every set
of obligations, P .
First, firms pay interest to banks, due on outstanding loans, where each





Then, firms and the government pay wages to each household employee





The government pays unemployment benefits to unemployed workers at






Figure 2: Stylized multi-layer network representation of contractual inter-
action channels between agents.
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Banks also pay interest to households and firms over their deposit liabil-





At the end of each period, the central banks calculates its profits rcb,t by
subtracting the interest it pays on excess reserve deposits iRRb,t−1 from the
interest receipts on government bonds i¯BBt−1 and from advances i¯Acb,tAcb,t.
After that, the central banks transfers its profit to the government.
∆Rb,t = rcb,t. (32)
Firms pay dividends to their capital suppliers by multiplying their after-
tax profit with the dividend pay-out ratio:
∆Df,t = ρxrf,t. (33)
They then distributes these dividends equally among all households.











After that, firms pays taxes to the government by multiplying their profit
by the tax rate.
∆Df,t = τrr. (35)
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Finally, households pay a flat tax rate τy over their wages wht, dividends











In the next step, consumers switch banks if they observe a more favourable
deposit rate than the one they receive from their current bank.
2.4.20 Bankruptcies
If, at any point, a firm’s or a bank’s assets minus its liabilities are below
zero, it enters a state of default.
dff,t =
{





True if Rb + IBb + Lb +Bb −Db −Ab < 0
False , otherwise
. (38)
If in default, firms and banks are bailed in by their household owners
and their depositors. This happens so that the total number of firms and
banks remains constant.
2.4.21 Bond supply
The government calculates its deficit as tax revenues plus central bank prof-
its, minus wages, unemployment benefits and interest on bonds. To cover
the deficit, it issues bonds to the amount ∆Bt at a fixed price p
B.
∆Bsg,t =
txg,t + rcb,t −
∑




Banks buy government bonds with their excess reserves.
Bdb,t =
{





If a bank has excess reserves left, it determines its demand for reserves,
or supply of reserves, on the inter-bank market as the difference between
reserve requirement Rdbt = DbtLR
d






Subsequently, reserve-supplying banks adjust their mark up on the price
of reserve. This mark-up is the difference between their average generic
interest rate i¯lb,tL and the risk free reserves rate i
R







Reserve–supplying and reserve–demanding banks are then matched on
the interbank market according to the general matching protocol.
2.4.24 Government bond market -second interaction
Any bonds which were not purchased by private banks will then be pur-
chased by the central bank, so that central bank demand for bonds will be





Finally, if banks cannot obtain enough reserves on the inter-bank market,
they borrow the remainder from the central bank as advances. The central







We initialze the model with 4,000 households, 100 consumption firms, 20
capital firms, 10 banks, a single central bank, and a single government. We
apply the six–step strategy for initializing the model described in Caiani
et al. [33]. For model consistency, it is important that for all agents, as-
sets equal liabilities plus net worth at the start. We therefore determine
initial values of all parameters and state variables consistent with an aggre-
gate stock-flow consistent model in steady state satisfying these properties.
Next, we distribute the aggregated variables homogeneously and symmetri-
cally across agents. This creates for the first period a ‘memory‘ of fictitious
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past sales, past wages, past profits and so on, as the basis for first–period
backward–looking expectations. We also define a historical structure. That
is, we assume that in the periods before the simulation starts, firms obtained
loans and consumption firms invested in new capital to maintain their pro-
ductive capacity.
We further assume that the real value (i.e. corrected for inflation) of the
new loans or of the new capital goods was constant in each of these periods.
Based on a constant inflation rate and an amortization schedules for capital
goods and loans, we derive the outstanding value for each of these stocks,
so that their total value sums up to the amount determined in the previous
step. Using this set-u, no agent starts the simulation with an advantage
over other agents. Initial values are reported in tables 2, 3, and ?? in the
appendix.
3 Results
In this section, we explore the dynamics of the model. First, we characterize
the baseline model dynamics. Then, we add an interest rate shock and
explore the transmission channels in detail.
3.1 Model dynamics
Once the simulation starts, four distinct phases emerge: a bust, boom, an-
other bust, and eventually a quasi steady state. Figure 3 shows how (1)
GDP, (2) unemployment and (3) prices evolve over time. Figure 4 shows
the aggregate balance sheets for each sector. Finally, figure 5 shows the
evolution of prices in all six markets. The dotted vertical lines mark the
beginning of each phase.
Initially, wages are rising as all workers start out employed labour costs
rise and consumption goods price increase.
3.1.1 Period 10 - 62: Bust
In the first stage, some firms which have over-employed workers start to fail.
They lay off workers, which leads to a fall in demand for consumption goods
and then for capital goods, so that capital goods prices fall (Figure 5 panel
3). In spite of falling consumption, due to declines in wages and therefore
costs, consumption prices remain relatively stable. On financial markets, low
demand for credit means relatively high capital ratios and therefore falling
interest rates on loans. Furthermore, deposit interest rates fall and interbank
interest rates are relatively stable due to the central bank monetary policy
interest rates.
16
Figure 3: Mean and standard deviation of: (1) actual and potential GDP,
(2) unemployment, and (3) consumption price index (base: t = 0).
Figure 4: Sectoral balance sheet compositions of (1) consumption firms, (2)
households, (3) capital firms, (4) banks, (5) the central bank, and the (6)
government.
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Figure 5: Mean and standard deviation of market prices of (1) labour, (2)
consumption goods, (3) capital goods, (4) interest on loans, (5) interest on
deposits, and (6) interest on inter-bank loans.
3.1.2 Period 62 - 160: Boom
In the ‘boom‘ stage, government unemployment benefits and fixed labour
demand acts as a floor on consumption, at the cost of heavy government
borrowing (figure 4 panel 6. As firms extrapolate expectations, they dis-
invest a little below the government induced floor on consumption. With
firms below capacity, consumption prices shoot up. Consumption firms see
their profitability recover. Soon after, they start employing more house-
holds, paying more wages, increasing consumption and so on. In line with
rising demand, investment and credit also pick up. Potential capacity starts
to outpace sales.
3.1.3 Period 160 - 300: Bust Again
As the economy reaches full employment, labour becomes the bottleneck
to growth. Consumption goods reach overcapacity. They experience high
wage levels and declining revenues as their output prices start falling. Their
reduction in investment triggers revenue declines in capital firms, rising un-
employment and falling demand: the second bust. The dynamics are similar
to those of the first bust, but at lower wages and higher price levels. Fewer
firms fail this time around, and the downturn is less severe.
3.1.4 Period 300 - : Quasi Steady State
The second bust is followed by a moderate upswing, after which the econ-
omy reaches a quasi steady state. GDP, unemployment and prices are now
relatively stable. Note that while the economy in aggregate seems to reach a
quasi-steady-state, Figure 5 shows this does not apply to all markets. In the
quasi-steady-state balance sheets are relatively stable with the exception of
18
capital firms which continue to hoard deposits.
In sum, the JMAB model economy experiences an endogenous business
cycle. The model is capable of reproducing real-world correlations across
macroeconomic time series, as shown in detail in Caiani et al. [33]. This is
the laboratory in which we will now conduct a monetary policy experiment.
3.2 Monetary transmission
Monetary policy transmission is the pass-through of changes in central bank
policies (usually, in overnight interest rates) to target variables (usually,
inflation). In our model, this may occur through a credit channel, an in-
vestment channel, a consumption channel, and a cost channel. With the
exception of the cost channel, these channels work via changes in economic
slack (the output gap), which has an impact on inflation [38]: inflation picks
up when the economy is near capacity. We run two experiments to probe the
strength of these channels. We are also interested in changes in the strength
of the channels over the business cycle. In each experiment, we increase the
central bank rate five times, see table 1. In the first experiment, this takes
place in the boom period at tmon = 125, when the economy is near full
capacity. In the second experiment the central bank rate hike takes place in
the quasi-steady-state at tmon = 300.
Experiment Ψmon tmon
A 0 (125, 300)
B 0.001 (125, 300)
C 0.002 (125, 300)
D 0.003 (125, 300)
E 0.004 (125, 300)
Table 1: Experiments
Regardless of the channels, monetary policy first affects banks. We con-
sider a change in two standing facility interest rates - the deposit facility
rate and the marginal lending facility rate [39]. The monetary transmission
mechanism starts with a monetary policy shock on the interbank market at
t=350, as shown in figure 6. Following equation 42, banks determine their
interbank ask price as the difference between the rate they charge on loans
and the risk free rate corrected for maturity. The central bank rate hike
increases banks’ funding costs, both through the interbank market and by
increasing the cost of advances. The increase in funding costs are translated
into higher loan and deposit rates. As the risk free rate rises so do interbank
rates.
Banks set deposit rates according to equation 10, increasing or decreasing
their rates based on profitability, χp, liquidity, χLR, and funding costs, χfu.
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Figure 6: Central bank and interbank rates experiment 1 (left) and experi-
ment 2 (right).
Of these, funding costs increase, especially for those banks who derive a
large part of their funding from advances or interbank loans.
Regarding loan rates, banks follow equation 9 and respond to changes
in their funding costs and capital ratio relative to target capital ratio. As
their funding costs increase, loan rates increase. However, interbank and
advances rates are only a small part of the total funding cost mix for banks.
Furthermore, the effects of the rate hike on the difference between actual
and target capital ratios is not straightforward. The target capital ratio is
set by the central bank, which is based on the credit–to–GDP ratio. The
actual capital ratio is determined by bank profitability. This moderates the
effect.
Figures 7 and 8 show exactly that. On average, deposit and loan rates
respond to the central bank rate but pass-through is weak and highly non-
linear.
3.2.1 Credit channels
Bank credit supply is also affected. Following equation 14, banks only extend
credit if they believe the expected return is bigger than the expected loss.
The central bank rate hike influences the expected return, since cash flows
are now discounted at a higher rate. Bernanke [40] identifies this effect as
the bank lending channel. The lending channel describes the influence of
short-term interest rates on bank lending volumes. As banks funding costs
increase they reduce the quantity of credit [8]. This reduction in credit
affects investment and inflation.
Indirectly, the rate hike also influences the interest rates on loans and
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Figure 7: Interest on bank loans in experiment 1 (left) and experiment





Figure 8: Bank deposit rates in experiment 1 (left) and experiment 2 (right),






therefore the debt service and the value of collateral. Bernanke [40] also
identifies a balance sheet channel. In the balance sheet channel, the reduced
net worth of firms, after an interest rate hike, reduces credit. However, in
our model banks do not discount the value of collateral. It is only indirectly
effected through changes in interest payments on other loans.
Figure 9: Constrained credit in experiment 1 (left) and experiment 2 (right),





In summary, monetary policy transmission to the financial sector occurs
largely via changes in funding costs, the risk-free rate of interest and credit
rationing. Assumptions about banks decision rules (equations 7, 10, 14,
and 42) are critical. The magnitude of reliance by banks on central bank
advances and the interbank market determines the strength of funding cost
effects. Furthermore, the relative reliance of firms on bank credit vis-a-vis
equity influences the strength of the bank lending channel.
3.2.2 The investment channel
Firms‘ desire to invest might also be affected by monetary policy. In this
investment channel [6], higher bank lending rates as a result of increased
funding costs discourages business investment. This slows down the econ-
omy and reduces inflationary pressure. Additionally, Mishkin [41] identifies
the asset price channel. An increase in bank funding costs, and subsequently
loan rates, causes a decrease in firms’ net worth, reducing investment de-
mand by firms through a wealth effect [42].
In our model, firm investment decisions are first and foremost motivated
by real factors. Following equation 7, firms determine a desired rate of
growth based on expected profit and capacity utilization. Both are indirectly
affected by interest changes. Following equation 11, firms try to finance their
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Figure 10: Total bank credit in experiment 1 (left) and experiment 2 (right),





investment first with equity. All terms in this equation are indirectly affected
by the changes in deposit and loan interest rates.
In the case of a rate rise in the steady–state phase, we see no clear
downward trend relative to the baseline scenario in the share of firms that
is credit constrained. However, in the case of bigger rate rises, we see larger
increases in investment demand. This seems counter-intuitive; but it can
be understood from interactions with the lending channel. As credit is
constrained for all firms, inventories pile up as a consequence of insufficient
investment, and this pushes up demand for investment.
Figure 12 summarizes the various credit and investment transmission
mechanisms. In our model the transmission operates primarily through
credit supply.
3.2.3 the consumption channel
In the consumption channel [6], changes in interest rates might effect house-
hold consumption decision through a wealth effect, or by changing the
propensity to consume (equation 23). In the model, monetary policy influ-
ences households desired consumption through the propensity to consume
out of wealth, expected inflation, and wealth plus income levels. Higher (ex-
pected) interest rates make consumption less attractive relative to saving.
A second consumption channel works through inflation expectations. As
these are formed adaptively through equation 2, they depend on actual
inflation, which is influenced through all channels. In our model, this effect
is therefore difficult to quantify. Since there is no household lending in the
model, there is no wealth effect. But there is an income effect of increased
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Figure 11: Desired real investment in experiment 1 (left) and experiment 2





Figure 12: Credit and investment channels.
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deposit rates [43].
Figure 13: Consumption channels.
These mechanisms can be contradictory. A change in interest payments
on deposits causes increased income and increased consumption, but also
greater attraction to hold deposits rather than spending them on consump-
tion. Further, the effect of expected inflation depends on actual inflation,
which in turn depends on the strength of all transmission channels. The
strength and sign of the effect of the rate hike thus depends on the change
in propensity to consume, the importance of interest rate income for house-
holds and the total effect on inflation. The net effect is typically very small
since interest payments compared to other income are so small. Figure 13
summarizes the consumption channels.
Figure 14 shows that these contradictory effects change desired consump-
tion, but the effect is small.
Figure 14: Desired real consumption in experiment 1 (left) and experiment







In addition to the output gap type channels, Barth and Ramey[44] propose
the existence of a cost channel in which changes in interest rates transmit to
changes in funding costs for firms and then into higher prices (Figure 15).
Tillman [45] and Gaiotti and Secchi[46] find empirical evidence for the ex-
istence of such a cost channel.
Figure 15: The cost channel.
In our model, the cost channel exists. Following equation 5, firms prices
are a mark-up of unit labour and interest rate costs. Changes in interest
rates charged by banks result in changes interest payments for firms. Figure
16 shows that these costs are small compared to wage costs and again con-
flicting mechanisms are at work. Since credit is rationed at higher interest
rates, higher rates lead to reduced interest costs for those firms which are
barred from the credit market. We find that the biggest rate hike leads to
an increase in labour costs, but a decrease in debt service costs. As firm
costs are only marginally impacted, profits are likewise almost unaffected,
so that there is no discernible impact on firms’ output or pricing behaviour.
The strength of the cost channel depends greatly on the size of interest costs
compared to other costs, the amount of credit rationed through the bank
lending channel, and the other interaction effects.
3.3 GDP and inflation
We now look into the effect of the shock on GDP and inflation. Figure 17
shows that in experiment 1 the monetary policy shock impacts inflation and
GDP but no clear trend emerges. Only consumer prices drop significantly
more after the biggest rate shock. The effects of the same shock in experi-
ment 2, in the steady state, are much bigger. We also observe an effect on
GDP -a lower boom but convergence to the same steady state. Furthermore,
there are larger changes in the consumer price index, also for smaller shocks.
While the central bank interest rate hikes do affect the dynamics of the
economy, the clearest result appears to be the highly non-linear impact on
the target variable inflation. To analyse this, we performed an additional
26
Figure 16: Top: debt service over wage costs for experiment 1 (left) and
experiment 2 (right). Bottom: wage costs for experiment 1 (left) and 2





Figure 17: Top: GDP for experiment 1 (left) and 2 (right). Bottom: con-
sumption goods prices for experiment 1 (left) and 2 (right), where from A






experiment in which we gradually increased the shock size Ψmon from zero
to 0.008. Figure 18 shows how small rate hikes at first have large positive
effect on the mean price levels. Between 0.0035 and 0.004, quite suddenly,
there is a transition to a small negative effect ,which changes again between
0.0065 and 0.007.
Figure 18: Rate hike increase versus the mean price change from baseline.
4 Summary, Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we applied a financial complexity model to the question of
monetary transmission mechanisms. We simulated a Central Bank policy
rate shock and analysed how the monetary policy transmission channels,
identified in the literature, operate in this model. A unique feature of the
model, compared to other work, is its detailed inter-bank market, which
allows for a realistic treatment of monetary policy implementation. We
trace the effects through banks, firms and households of interest rate shocks
of different sizes and at different stages of the business cycle. Three findings
stand out. Of all transmission channels, the bank lending channel appears
the strongest. Second, the effects are highly non-linear. Third, since the
model economy exhibits path-dependency, timing matters: changes to Bank
rate in a boom have markedly different impacts from interest rate shocks in
macroeconomic stability.
The analyses presented here are only a beginning, and they do not yet
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fully exploit the potential of this agent-based, stock-flow consistent model.
In future work, we aim to first explore the reasons for a number of model
features, which differ markedly from reality: a zero GDP growth steady
state (due to lack of technical progress in this model, we surmise), high
unemployment (of about 20%), and complete deleveraging (credit stocks
going to zero) after severe shocks. In short, we want to validate the model
to empirical data. The aim should not be to completely mimic reality in all
these respects, but to understand these features better.
Future research options include the following. One could follow clusters
of firms, bank and households through simulation time, observing how their
balance sheets and activities change due to the Central Bank rate shock,
and due to their interactions with other agents. This heterogeneity is key to
understanding aggregate impacts, as the Yellen [10] quote in the introduction
stressed.
Likewise, another promising avenue is to observe distributional outcomes
of monetary policy. Furthermore, we believe extending the economy with an
asset market and household debt would uncover other important channels.
Yet another extension of the analysis is to take the simulation data and
tease out the key patterns and correlations with econometric methods. This
is one way to provide evidence on the existence and channels of monetary
policy transmission in this model world, just as is often done with actual
data.
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A Variables and parameters
Symbol Description Initial value
∆Yss Nominal rate of growth in the steady state 0.0075
Popsizehh Number of households 4000
Popsizecf Number of consumption firms 100
Popsizekf Number of capital firms 20
Popsizeb Number of banks 10
Popsizeg Number of governments 1
Popsizecb Number of central banks 1
lcf Consumption firms initial workers 4000
lkf Capital firms initial workers 1000
lg Government labour demand 1360
ν Initial unemployment 0.08
ilb Initial interest rate on loans 0.0075
idb Initial interest rate on deposits 0.0025
CRtr Initial banks’ target capital ratio 0.17996
LRtr Initial banks’ target liquidity ratio 0.258026342
iRcb CB interest rate on reserves (bank rate) 0
w Initial wages 5
i¯B Bond interest rate 0.0025
p¯B Bonds price 1
∆pCG Inflation 0.0075
L Total private credit 53492.5
Y Nominal GDP 45146.4
Table 2: Global Variables
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Symbol Description Possible values
idx Unique agent identifier 1 - 8121
Dx Amount of deposits 0 - ∞
CGx Amount of consumption goods 0 - ∞
KGx Amount of capital goods 0 - ∞
Lx Amount of loans 0 - ∞
Rx Amount of reserves 0 - ∞
Bx Amount of bonds 0 - ∞
Ax Amount of advances 0 - ∞
IBx Amount of interbank loans 0 - ∞
dfx Indicates whether an agent has defaulted True, False
ephh Identifier of the employer
Bank, firm, or
government
lx List of identities of workers List of households
vc Variable costs 0 - ∞
lc Unit labour costs 0 - ∞
o Output 0 - ∞
y Sales 0- ∞
k Selected supplier Firm identifier
nLb Non performing loans List of loans
iLb
Internal benchmark rate bank charges on
loans
0% - 100%
iDb Rate on deposits 0% - 100%
iIBb Rate for extending an interbank loan 0% - 100%
CR Capital adequacy ratio 0% - 100%
LR Liquidity ratio 0% - 100%
pB
Face value at which the government is
willing to release bonds
100%
iB
The percentage the government pays on
the face value of government bonds
0% - 100%
iR Rate on central bank reserve deposits -10% - 10%
CR Capital adequacy ratio 0% - 100%
LR Liquidity Ratio 0% - 100%
Table 3: Agent State Variables
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Symbol Description Initial value
α




Propensity to distribute dividends out of
excess capital
0.2
βf Risk aversion towards firms 0.01
γ3 Adaptive expectations weight 0.25
bD = bL = b




Intensity of choice in the consumption
and capital goods markets
1.50515
ζ Share of workers leaving their employer 0.01
ηL Loans duration 20
ηB Bonds duration 5
ηM Machines duration 20
θ∆k Probability of changing suppliers
θdf Probability of default free
ιc Haircut on defaulted firms’ capital value 0.5
κtrc Desired capacity rate of growth free
µ




Inflation, credit to GDP, profit, capacity
utilization, inventory target
0.02, 1.5, 0.04345, 0.8,
0.1
ξ
Number of potential partners interbank
market, goods markets, deposit and
credit markets, labour market
10, 5, 3, 10
ρ Dividend pay-out ratio firms, banks 0.9, 0.6
σD
Liquidity preference holding deposits as
share of wage disbursements
1
τy = τprofit Tax rate on income and profit 0.18
φU
Unemployment threshold (wage revision
function)
0.08
φpru Prudential threshold 0.1
φmon Monetary threshold 0.01
χ Information asymmetry in markets
Ψpru = Ψmon




ΨiR Bank rate mark-up 0.025
Ψucc,0




Initial mark-up on unit labour costs for
capital firms
0.075
Ω Dole share of average wages 0.4
Ω1 Profit rate weight (Investment function) 0.01
Ω2




Folded normal distribution mean and
standard deviation
(1, 0.0094)
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